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From Solitude to Freedom: Human Person and the Universe in 
  Russian Religious Philosophy 
 
    Alexei V. Nesteruk 
 
The paper deals with the issues of anxiety, solitude, homelessness and non-sense of human 
existence in the universe as they were posed and addressed in the Russian religious philosophy of 
the 20th century. Russian philosophers were seeking for overcoming of the present condition of 
humanity through the  restoration  of the lost Divine image, encapsulated in the notion of 
personhood. The difficulty of defining personhood proceeds from the paradoxical condition of 
humanity in the world reflected in perennial philosophy, as well as from a fundamental 
unknowability   of man by himself so clearly articulated by Patristic writers. The fulfillment of 
personhood implies the overcoming of the constraints and slavery to the rubrics of the incarnate 
existence in this physical world. It is in this movement that the sense of solitude and despair 
disappears because the whole of the human history, as well as the whole universe, are brought 
inside the infinite and incomprehensible  subjectivity of  man in the image of the Divine. Russian 
philosophers expressed a deep concern and care for man, the world and God through looking for 
the consolation of the soul of all humanity from within a limited historical period in the 20th 
century’s history full of apostasy and demonic inhumanity. Their hymnology to man is the 
perennial attempt to affirm this world as still imbued with faith, hope and love.   
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unconditional being, universe,  
 
 
От одиночества к свободе: человеческая личность и вселенная в 
русской религиозной философии 
 
А. В. Нестерук 
 
В статье обсуждаются проблемы тревоги, одиночества, бесприютности и бессмысленности 
человеческого существования в той форме, как они были сформулированы в русской 
религиозной философии ХХ века. Русские философы искали пути преодоления такого 
состояния человека на путях восстановления утраченного Божественного образа, 
выражаемого с помощью представления о личностности. Трудность в определении 
личности проистекает из парадоксального состояния человека во вселенной (являющимся 
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предметном вечной философии), а также непознаваемости человека самим собой,  
(осознанной Отцами ранней Церкви).  Достижение существования в полноте личности 
предполагает преодоления ограничений и рабства воплощенного  существования в 
физическом мире. В этом духовном движении ощущение одиночества и безисходности 
преодолевается, ибо вся человеческая история, как и вся вселенная, артикулируются и 
приобретают смысл изнутри бесконечной и непознаваемой субъективности человека в 
Божественном образе. Русские философы были глубоко озабочены состоянием человека и 
его взаимоотношения с миром и Богом, осуществляя поиск путей утешения души всего 
человечества в ограниченный исторический период ХХ века, насыщенного 
отступничеством и бесчеловечностью. Гимн русских философов человеку был вкладом в 
нескончаемые усилия по утверждению мира как по-прежнему наполненного верой, 
надеждой и любовью.  
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“The eternal silence of the infinite spaces 
terrifies me. Console yourself: it is not from 
yourself that you must expect anything: on the 
contrary, your expectation must lie in expecting 
nothing from yourself”  (B. Pascal, Pensées, p. 
110). 
  
     
   
Introduction: solitude on the 
crossroads of anthropology and 
cosmology1 
 
The first half of the 20th century, with its 
wars and revolutions initiated a 
philosophical response in the academia 
and intelligencia, asserting the tragic and 
ever escaping sense of the human 
existence, diminution of the value of 
human life and its “low cost” as paid by 
the societies and politically struggling 
powers attempting to impose their 
utopias of a universal world-order. 
Russian philosophers, who experienced  
deeper than others the turmoil and 
uncertainty of the surrounding world, as 
well as the loss of hope for humanity’s 
reconciliation in its progression towards 
the eternal good, expressed the sense of 
this loss through a characteristic  
invocation of the old philosophical 
motives which intellectually tortured 
their predecessors. Their dissatisfaction 
and the vision of the vanity of the human 
attempt to find the ground for the sense 
of existence in this world gave rise to a 
cosmological anxiety leading to a 
question of the possibility of liberation 
from all chains to this world and to the 
search for the source of existence in the 
transcendent Divine. Evgenii Trubetskoi 
started his book “The Sense of Life”, 
written in 1918, with the tackling of that 
which seemed to be inevitable in the 
human condition, namely the “non-sense 
of existence” («бессмыслица 
существования») indicated by him as 
an eternal repetition in the circle of birth 
and death, when “every life attempts to 
rise above the earth but falls anew back 
onto it without any hope of succeeding, 
mingling with the dust of the earth; and 
the wings by which it takes off turn out 
to be no more than an illusory and 
disappearing poetical embellishment” 
(Trubetskoi 1922, p. 34). 2      
 
 In 1939, Nikolai Berdyaev wrote 
emphatically in his book on the slavery 
and freedom of humanity that “a 
condition of anguish and distress is 
deeply inherent in personality as such. 
Man feels himself to be a creature which 
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is suspended over an abyss. And it is just 
in man as person, breaking away from 
the primitive trend to collective 
existence, that this feeling reaches a 
special degree of acuteness” (Berdyaev 
1943, p. 52).3 Berdyaev accentuates the 
fact that in order to have an ability of 
being aware of the non-sense of 
existence and to be able to be in a state 
of distress one must transcend the 
natural level of existence to the state of 
“personhood”. The “abyss” over which a 
human creature realizes its material 
insignificance has, according to 
Berdyaev, not only natural, but also 
social dimensions. The “abyss” is 
everything which symbolizes the 
suspension of human freedom, 
uniqueness and its sense of centrality in 
the universe, that is man as a special 
creature.  
 
 In a similar vein Semion Frank 
expressed in 1956 the human anxiety of 
existence without foundation: “Our self 
or ‘soul’ is conscious…of its poverty 
and insufficiency, of the inherent 
tragedy of its existence…. In so far as it 
attains true self-consciousness, it is 
inevitably aware of its solitude and 
homelessness in the world of fact in 
which it is bound to participate and to 
which it is largely subordinated” (Frank 
1965, p. 97).4 He uses words similar to 
Berdyaev by asserting that it is through 
self-consciousness of its own internal 
reality that man is also conscious of  its 
inherent instability, that it is hanging 
over the abyss and looses the sense of 
life so that all this brings it to the search 
of support beyond itself (Frank 1965, p. 
102). In what concerns the uncertainty of 
a cosmic ground in human existence, 
which was articulated by the sciences of 
the first half of the 20th century, both 
Berdyaev and Frank reproduce a 
cosmological sentiment which is 
famously attributed to Pascal in respect 
to his saying that “the eternal silence of 
the infinite spaces terrifies me”5.  In fact,  
that which Berdyaev and Frank 
rearticulated in the 20th century was also  
articulated by existential philosophers 
before them. It is enough to recall 
Kierkegaard who expressed in a 
dramatic form his anxiety about the 
impossibility to describe one’s position 
in being: “One sticks his finger in the 
ground in order to judge where one is. I 
stick my finger in existence — it feels 
like nothing. Where am I? What is the 
‘world’? What does this word mean? 
Who has duped me into the whole thing, 
and now leaves me standing there? Who 
am I? How did I come into the world; 
why was I not asked, why was I not 
informed of the rules and regulations… 
How did I come to be involved in this 
great enterprise called actuality? Why 
should I be involved in it? Am I not free 
to decide? Am I to be forced to be part 
of it? Where is the manager, I would like 
to make a complaint!” (Kierkegaard 
2009, p. 60). What is encapsulated in 
these questions of Kierkegaard is the 
longing for answering questions about 
the central characteristics of human 
existence, that is the demand for 
constructing an anthropology released 
from cosmological conditions. The lack 
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of understanding of the foundations of 
the human existence naturally leads to 
anxiety and an acute sense of solitude in 
the world. As Berdyaev continues, 
“yearning is directed upwards and is a 
mark of man’s  higher nature” (Berdyaev 
1943, pp. 52-53).6  The height of human 
nature is manifested exactly in its ability 
to perceive its own homelessness and 
solitude in the world. The sense of 
solitude and search for its ultimate 
ground in the world do not diminish the 
place of man in nature in spite of its 
inability to assimilate to nature. On the 
contrary, it is this search and anxiety of 
existence that position man as 
transcending nature. Once again, the 
acuteness of being a person and the 
quintessence of personhood, becomes 
manifest only under the condition  of 
living through solitude. In different 
words, true anthropology is possible 
only when humanity turns face to face to 
itself, that is to its internal world, by 
disregarding assertions about its 
grounding in nature and cosmos. 
 
 From the point of view of the 
history of philosophy, anthropological 
thought was reaching its depths only 
when human beings experienced an 
acute sense of loneliness. In the 
transparency of its non-attunement to the 
universe and  its homelessness in it, 
humanity turns to itself  by posing a 
question of its own existence and thus 
making the very process of  
philosophical enquiry to be the central 
point of its experience of living. 
Roughly speaking, the history of 
philosophy, as it concerns anthropology, 
can be permanently divided into two 
ever permeating and still distinct periods: 
the first is when humanity comfortably 
places itself among natural things thus 
making the world  home for itself; the 
second can be characterized, using 
Heideggerian language, as homelessness. 
In the first case humanity considers the 
whole world as a hierarchical building in 
which humanity finds its place as its 
organic although not very significant 
part. This way of thinking is typical for 
some apologists of the modern 
“cosmological perception” of humanity 
where the whole cosmos is treated not as 
a hostile and alien reality full of 
impersonal physical forces, but that 
harmonized and balanced cosmos which 
has sense of its existence from itself, 
regardless of whether humanity exists or 
not (Primack, Abrams, 2006). 
Historically it has its root in the 
Aristotelian view where humanity looses 
its sense of being a problem for itself, 
where man is considered to be an object 
and an “accident”, where man appears to 
itself only as “one of as kind”, but not as 
“I”. Here the internal dimension of the 
subjective perception of existence is 
abandoned and the place and sense of 
humanity in the world can only be 
disclosed through its position in the 
universe, the outer cosmos.  One can say 
that it is man that is to receive the  
comprehension  of its place in the world 
and not vice versa, that is the world as 
receiving its comprehension from the 
reality of man. The Greek tendency to 
think of man as positioned in space 
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received its consummation in the 
Aristotelian world view of concentric 
heavenly spheres. It is important to 
stress that for Aristotle his model was 
not only an intelligible image of reality, 
it was treated as physically real so that 
the place of humanity in the cosmos also 
was very real. Thus this humanity was 
freed for a while from anxiety of 
displacement in space of the universe 
and its homelessness.  Man was in his 
own home – the universe, although with 
a very peculiar position in it between the 
very large and very small. 7  
Consequently the questions of 
anthropology and a quest for the sense of 
existence were not present in such a 
picture of the world.  
 
 
 The anxiety and the sense of 
homelessness in this visible world came 
later when Christianity appropriated 
Hellenistic philosophy under the rubrics 
of what is known as Patristic synthesis. 
The basic change in the picture of the 
world which Christianity evoked was a 
conviction that the genuine reality of 
man is not of this world, so that the 
visible universe, be it Greek concentric 
spheres or Biblical flatland, is a 
temporary  shelter for humanity whose 
destiny is beyond space and time. 
Christianity not only deprived humanity 
of the constancy of its cosmic habitation, 
it brought a new idea in anthropology, 
that human beings live in between two 
worlds,  so that there is a constant battle 
between bodily affections and 
aspirations of the soul. Then is not 
surprising that St. Augustine, the Latin 
Father of the fifth century was seriously 
wrestling with the question of a human 
being’s own nature. The more he was 
looking into the depth of his own 
existence, the more the mystery of 
humanity started to form, pointing to the 
non-worldly and non-transient sense of 
the human existence known only to God. 
The patristic amazement at the mystery 
of humanity was of a fundamentally 
different kind in comparison with that of 
Aristotle, for example. The latter was 
amazed by human being in the context 
of his amazement by everything which 
surrounded him. The Fathers of the 
Church saw in human beings a creature 
fundamentally incommensurable with 
respect to any other creature in the world. 
In spite of popular ideas of the 
microcosm they clearly articulated the 
Divine image in humanity as a main 
feature of its incommensurability with 
the rest of creation. Humanity turned out 
to be on the cross-roads of two worlds so 
that humanity was deprived of any 
ultimate sense of attachment, attunement 
and home. This was the intrinsic 
conviction of the Christian faith and, as a 
consequence,  there was a lack of any 
accomplished cosmology and 
anthropology in the worldly sense. For 
man by definition was an open-ended 
creature involving the whole universe 
into the process of its ongoing 
incarnation. Any attempt to pin down the 
human cosmos and to create a home for 
man, whether this  was the naturalistic 
cosmology or Biblical cosmos,  
neutralized the acuteness of the main 
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anthropological question on the sense of 
the human existence. As long as the 
solitude and uncertainty of existence in 
between two worlds drives humanity to 
the realization of its saving telos, the 
mystery of man, one hopes, will be 
resolved in the age to come. In this sense 
Russian Orthodox religious thinkers 
always treated all secular anthropology 
and psychology as essentially apophatic, 
that is attempting to disclose the sense of 
human existence only in terms of certain 
(sometimes socially oriented) signifiers 
which never exhaust the mystery of man, 
that is that which is signified.  
 
 For Russian religious 
philosophers the question on the 
meaning of human existence has a 
logical and philosophical sense only in 
the context of its relation to the 
transworldly foundation of this existence, 
that is in God. However they were eager 
to explicate why the non-religious 
consciousness did struggle with the 
determination of the place of man in the 
created being. And sometimes they had 
to use philosophical arguments without 
any explicit recourse to religious 
conviction. On the one hand the origin of 
the sense of solitude and homelessness 
in the universe (and hence the non-sense 
of life) had to be explicated. Then there 
was an impasse of what to do with such 
a conclusion. Naturalistic anthropology 
would condemn humanity to being 
“walking dust” in the universe, such that 
its existence is already outdated. Here 
the agony of the human  reason reaches 
its climax because it brings humanity to 
a dead end. If one wills to live one needs 
to understand “why?”  and for what 
purpose. But these questions are 
equivalent to an interrogation on the 
sense of humanity, and there is only one 
exit from this impasse: to change the 
method and means of anthropology and 
stop asking question about the sense of 
life  only in the manner of naturalism. 
The naturalistic account simply does not 
provide any desired answer, leaving 
humanity with the same predicament. 
The desired anthropology demands 
transcendence of  its   naturalistic scope. 
This inevitably asserts humanity as 
delivered  from the necessities of nature, 
that is being in possession of an 
unmasterable  freedom from anything in 
this world from the very moment of its 
appearance in the incarnate condition. 
Thus the remedy for solitude and anxiety 
is freedom. Berdyaev qualifies this as 
liberation from slavery of the 
conditioned, from  slavery to  nature and 
cosmos, in particular. But this break to 
the kingdom of freedom requires, first of 
all, rethinking of the essence of the 
created existence after the Fall and thus 
overcoming its limitations and its 
fringed phenomenality on the level of 
reason. Only then will enlightened 
reason be able to realise itself in freedom 
through practice.  
 
 Let us now try to trace those 
steps which Berdyaev assigns to the 
process of knowledge that lead to the 
rise of the sense of solitude and anxiety. 
He purs a stress on the idea of 
objectivisation. According to him 
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objectivisation is a natural reaction to 
what the knowing subject experiences 
when it attempts to find a ground for 
himself and his knowledge. In a 
technical language, knowledge  of the 
world always seeks for a “frame of 
coordinates”, that is the system of 
reference in order to start its account of 
existence. In this sense the process of 
knowing implies a sort of estrangement, 
understood as creating an external 
reference point with respect to which the 
subject can position itself, for as such 
“the knowing subject is deprived of any 
interior existence, he does not possess 
any reference to rely on in being, he 
exists only in the background and in 
relation to the objectivisation exercised 
by him” (Berdyaev 2003[1], p. 53).8  But 
the objectivisation produces objects, that 
is phenomena with one-sided 
phenomenality,  that is those shots of 
phenomena where all unrepeatedly 
individual is lost and one can catch only 
the generic, common and invariant with 
respect to the circumstances of life. Such 
a fringed phenomenality with respect to 
the world is described by Berdyaev as 
giving an image of the fallen and 
bewitched world where only phenomena 
exist but not beings (existents) 
(Berdyaev 2003[1], p. 62).  
 
 Berdyaev, being a religious 
philosopher, links the very tendency of 
objectivising the content of knowledge 
with the conditions of the Fall, that is 
with that nature of humanity which is 
distorted by sin.  For him all aspects of 
human activity, including exploring and 
learning of the universe, are related to 
the postlapserian condition. 
Correspondingly the human sense of 
reality of  the universe and man’s place 
in it is affected by that obscurity which 
had been imposed after the Fall on the 
initial human faculties.  According to the 
teaching of the Church, before the Fall it 
was the unity between man and the 
universe through which the universe was 
to follow man to its “end”, analytically 
described as the overcoming of divisions 
(diairesis) in creation (Maximus the 
Confessor). Man’s transgression set 
nature off course, making it develop in 
enclosure with itself, isolated and blind, 
devoid of any telos and doomed to 
futility. Matter was deprived of its 
development towards the spirit, it 
stopped being humanised and being 
subjected to transfiguration.  Humanity 
did not change its place in creation, but 
it did change its relation with creation 
and hence its perception and 
understanding of the created universe, its 
sense and meaning as related to the task 
of mediation which was handed to man 
and which he did not fulfil.  What is 
characteristic for the present condition is 
that the very process of learning   of the 
external world is the direct consequence 
of this condition as the necessity of 
adaptation and biological survival9  (as 
well as a still archetypically present, but 
obscured, desire to grasp the sense of 
humanity in the universe). The learning 
itself is the result of the obstacle that 
appeared between man and God, a moral 
division which, in order to be overcome, 
must be studied. This leads humanity to 
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see the universe in the image of its own 
moral decline, so that man builds the 
world in its own image (Clément 1976, 
pp. 102-103). This is that which 
Berdyaev calls objectivisation: the world 
is posed by human subjectivity as some 
out there, where the intrinsic presence of 
the human insight is lost. Theologically 
speaking the learning activities which 
are pursued by the sciences represent the 
content of what is meant by the 
“garments of skin” expressing the 
human condition after the Fall. This, 
nevertheless, does not diminish the 
positive aspects of the “garments of 
skin”, for they were granted to man after 
the Fall with the purpose not only of 
physical survival, but of the recreation 
and renewal of those obscured aspects of 
being created “in the image of God”, 
which were not destroyed and did not 
perish entirely. God did not strip man of 
his reason, as a manifestation of 
dominion over creation, and it is through 
the empirical and theoretical acquisition 
of the outer reality, that is through 
knowledge and scientific practices, that 
the world was shaped in a coherent 
image of the cosmos. However, the most 
important and constructive positive 
usage of the human condition in the 
“garments of skin” comes from the 
inherent possibility to search through the 
world involved in flux and mutability for 
the permanent good and the foundation 
of the world, that is, as we said before, to 
preserve an essential dimension of the 
human condition to transcend  the world, 
that is to resist being physically and 
spiritually supressed by the immensities 
of the universe, and to retain its 
difference and distinction from the world, 
its centrality to creation through  the 
survived  archetypical memory of the 
initial communion with God.   
 
 Once again, using Berdyaev’s 
words, to retrieve one’s own divine 
image (that is to use positively the 
“garments of skin”) the objectivisation 
must be overcome, that is there must be 
restored understanding that “the cosmos, 
mankind, nation, etc., are to be found in 
human personality as in an 
individualised universe or microcosm”, 
and that “their falling away from it, their 
ejection into external reality among 
objects, is the result of the fall of man, of 
his subordination to impersonal reality, 
exteriorisation, and 
alienation”(Berdyaev 1943, p. 42).10  To 
understand and overcome the 
inadequacy of objectivisation for 
understanding the sense and destiny of 
humanity one must rediscover the 
interior world of the person. Berdyaev 
writes: “There is no wholeness, no 
totality, no universality of any kind 
outside personality, it exists only within 
personality; outside that there is only a 
partial objectivised world”(Berdyaev 
1943, p. 42). 11    But to rediscover 
personhood behind the objectivised 
visions of reality means that one can 
look at the sense of scientific and 
sociological theories, not only as related 
to the mutable physical reality, but as 
those elements of instability and disorder, 
causing anxiety and despair in human 
hearts dressed in the “garments of skin”, 
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which advance them back to the 
archetypical state, that is towards that 
which is, paradoxically, beyond the 
present and belongs to the age to come.  
It is through the reversal of the “path of 
Adam” through spiritual insight into the 
sense of creation, as the process directed 
to the future, that the task of relating the 
universe to its creator, and as a result 
relating person to the source of its 
existence in God,   can only be fulfilled.  
In this vision the very process of 
knowledge, including a scientific one, 
can be interpreted, if one uses a thought 
of S. Bulgakov, as “the proprietorship of 
reason in nature, the restoration through 
labor of the ideal cosmos as an organism 
of ideas or ideal regularities in which 
cosmic forces are harmoniously merged 
and primordial matter and primordial 
energy—the ‘foremother’ of being—
take shape.” In this process  “science 
penetrates through the bark and pith of 
the chaos-cosmos to the ideal cosmos, 
the cosmos-Sophia” (Bulgakov 2000, p. 
195).12 But in this case even knowledge 
of the objectivized world can be 
interpreted as  “a tool for reviving the 
world, for the victory and self-
affirmation of life” (Bulgakov 2000, p. 
177)13 and hence the person. But if for 
Berdyaev the process of appropriation of 
the world is an interior fight for the 
human person to establish the sense of 
its existence through the movement 
away from the objectivized world, for 
Bulgakov a similar process would have a 
different objective as the transformation 
of the universe into the “all-organism of 
humanity” through the unbounded 
incarnation of humanity in the universe 
through its knowledge and exploration. 
The universe is to be humanized rather 
than vice versa, that is humanity 
assimilated into world and nature.      
 
Humanity’s position  in the universe 
and the paradox of human 
subjectivity 
 
What is common for many Russian 
philosophers is their formulation of the 
paradoxical condition of humanity in the 
universe which naturally appears in the 
objectivised scheme of things. The sense 
of this paradox can be easily grasped on 
cosmographic grounds. Indeed, along the 
same sentiments which tortured Pascal, 
according to modern cosmology human 
beings occupy practically an infinitely 
small part of the universe while being 
able to predicate the universe as actually 
infinite. The paradox is obvious: the 
finite, insignificant  embodied human 
agencies in the vast universe articulate 
the entire space-time span of the 
universe from a point-like position.  The 
ambivalence of humanity’s position in 
the universe can be expressed in terms of 
a famous philosophical paradox 
asserting that while  being in the 
universe, humanity is not of the universe. 
The dualism of the human position in the 
world, which is present in this paradox, 
constitutes the inherent feature of any 
discourse related to the global features of 
the world which has to reconcile the 
locality and contingency of the cosmic 
position of humanity  with its abilities to 
 11 
transcend this locality and encompass in 
theory the universe as a whole. 14   
 
Certainly for Russian 
philosophers the content of this paradox 
was not limited simply to humanity’s 
spatial  insignificance in the universe. 
They also experienced this paradox as a 
drama of the human freedom squeezed 
by the conditions of physical 
embodiment leading  to the fear of death 
and enslavement to this fear, according 
to Berdyaev (Berdyaev 1943,  p. 252). 
This paradox exhibited the limits on the 
exercise of the ultimate moral law, 
originating in the Divine, in the 
conditions of the world after the Fall. As 
it has been formulated by Kant, there is a 
difference in appreciation of  the things 
which fill the human mind with “the  
starry heavens above and the moral law 
within” (Kant 1959, p. 260). One can say 
that the content of the paradox explicates 
the drama of the human condition after 
the Fall. The ambivalence between 
appreciation of the reality of existence 
on the one hand, and the incessant and 
saturating presence of death as the end 
of life on the other hand, explicates the 
sense of the hidden impetus in the 
restoration of the fullness of the Divine 
image in humanity lost after the Fall.          
 
 One must point out that, 
historically, the paradox was formulated 
by early Christian theologians in the 
context of their teaching on the Divine 
image in man. Here is a passage from St. 
Gregory the Theologian (Naziansus) 
with a characteristic formulation of the 
paradox: “…the Artificier of the 
universe, the Logos, created man as a 
single living creature from both elements, 
that is to say from the nature of both the 
visible and the invisible worlds.”15. In St. 
Maximus the Confessor the paradox was 
interpreted in the context of faith in  God 
who created man in his own image and 
likeness, so that initially man was “like” 
God, that is  he was “all in all”. C.f. (Col. 
3:11). For example, Maximus described 
this presence of man in all things in 
terms of a potential unity of all creation, 
which was to be realised by man as 
originally created: “…man was 
introduced last among existent things, as 
the natural bond mediating between the 
extremes of the whole through his own 
parts, and bringing into unity in his own 
person those things which are by nature 
far distant from each other…”16.    Man 
was created in order to mediate between 
all divisions in creation, for example 
between the sensible (visible) and 
intelligible (invisible); Maximus writes:  
“As a compound of soul and body he 
[man] is limited essentially by 
intelligible and sensible realities, while 
at the same time he himself defines 
[articulates] these realities through his 
capacity to apprehend intellectually and 
perceive with his senses.” 17  
 
 Russian religious thought 
contributed to the formulation of this 
paradox by discussing the problem of the 
place of man in creation and his destiny. 
Let us give  a brief account of these 
formulations in order to accentuate the 
problem with which Russian 
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philosophers were wrestling. If we start 
by quoiting  Vladimir Soloviov’s 
Readings on Godmanhood, then, for him, 
the ambivalence in humanity’s position 
in being can simply be expressed as the 
dichotomy between the internal freedom 
of man’s spirit and,  at the same time, its 
insignificance as a physical being in the 
great scheme of things:  
 “Modern man realises himself as 
free inside, above all that is external to 
him, and of any foundation which  is 
independent from him. He affirms 
himself as being the centre of all; 
however, in reality, he is an infinitely 
little point in the world’s 
circumference… On the one hand man is 
an existent being with an undoubted  
significance, with unconditional rights 
and demands, whereas the same man is 
only a limited and transient phenomenon, 
a fact among other facts, bounded by and 
dependent on them. And not only a 
particular man, but the whole 
mankind…” (Soloviev 1989, p. 21).18 
 
In a different passage Soloviev 
articulates this ambivalence in a more 
dramatic form: humanity manifests in 
itself the unity of the opposition between 
the visible (empirical) world and that 
which is beyond not only the visible, but 
beyond the created:  
 “Man comprises in himself all 
possible oppositions, all of which are 
reduced to one great opposition between 
the unconditional and conditional, or 
between the absolute and eternal being,  
and a transient phenomenon, an illusion. 
Man is deity and nothing at the same 
time” (Soloviev 1989, p. 113).19 
 
Here is another characteristic insight 
from N. Berdyaev:  
 “There are in personality natural 
foundation principles which are linked 
with the cosmic cycle. But the personal 
in man is of a different extraction and 
quality which always denotes a break 
with natural necessity... Man  as 
personality is not part of nature, he has 
within him the image of God. There is 
nature in man, but he is not nature. Man 
is a microcosm and therefore he is not 
part of the cosmos” (Berdyaev 1943, pp. 
94-95)20; hence  “the place of man in the 
natural world is tragic. Man is not only 
an object in this world, first of all he is 
subject  which cannot be deduced from 
an object. Given this, the relation of man 
to cosmos is determined through him 
being microcosm;  he enfolds cosmos 
and history...Through the spiritual in him, 
man is not subordinated to nature and 
independent of it although natural forces 
can kill him…He is a slave of nature and 
he is its lord” (Berdyaev 2003[2], p. 
588).21  
 
 This can be paralleled with Fr. 
Pavel Florensky, according to whom 
“nature and man are both infinite. And it 
is because of being infinite, that they are 
commensurable and can be parts of each 
other…Man is in the world, but man is 
complex to the same extent as the world. 
The world is in man, but the world  is 
also as complex as man” (Florensky  
1994, p. 186) 22 ; “Man is the 
 13 
recapitulation of the world, its summary; 
the world is the disclosure of man, its 
projection”(Florensky  1994, p. 187).23 
Sergei Bulgakov contributed to the same 
stream of thought: “On the one hand, 
man is potentially all, the potential 
centre of the  anthropo-cosmos, which, 
although, not yet realised but is being 
realised, on the other hand man is the 
product of this world, of the empirical” 
(Bulgakov 2000,  p. 146).24 
 
The implicit presence of the 
paradox in all objectivistic affirmations 
of the universe reflects the intrinsic split 
between the two different modes of 
intentionality.  The self-awareness of its 
own transcending nature happens when 
the intentionality has to deploy its means 
to cope with the constraints and 
pressures of the outer world 
(embodiment,  for example). The more 
the universe attempts to “crush human 
existence  under the weight of 
astronomical facts”, the more the 
egocentric intentionality prevails as a 
measure of resistance to it. The more the 
pressure of the outer world relaxes, the 
more the same intentionality relaxes and 
the transcendental “I” looses itself in the 
outer things. Thus the constraints of the 
constitution of the outer world which 
escape clear-cut definitions  and 
visibility constitute the very 
intentionality to the extent that it cannot 
fully cope with these constraints. Then 
one can see that the paradox of human 
subjectivity is not simply an 
epistemological conundrum, it reflects a 
genuine ambiguity or bipolarity of 
human beings, which must be 
existentially balanced. In this respect one 
can quote S. Frank, who, by formulating 
the existential dichotomy of human 
existence,  made a valuable comment 
that any attempt to remove this 
dichotomy or explain it away leads to a 
distorted anthropology and hence 
cosmology: 
 “Through his body and carnal 
life, and external layer of his mind 
determined by its connection with the 
body, man in himself forms part – a 
subordinate and insignificant part – of 
the objective world….Through his 
depths – through the kernel or root of his 
being, and in this sense through his true 
essence – he belongs to the transcendent 
primary reality…. Man thus has a dual 
nature, and every theory of life which 
fails to account for both aspects of his 
being is bound to be inadequate. ..The 
structure of our being is complex and 
antinomic, and all artificial 
simplification distorts it” (Frank 1965, p. 
34-35).25 
 
 Correspondingly the dialogue 
between theology and science, the 
problem of faith and knowledge by the 
virtue of its factual existence manifest 
and explicate the complex life of man as 
being split in its intentionalities between 
the mundane things of the world and 
their underlying foundation, including 
the foundation of the very consciousness 
which is responsible  for the facticity of 
both, namely theology and science.  
 
 14 
From the paradox of subjectivity to 
personhood 
 
The paradox of human subjectivity in the 
universe can be explicated as pointing 
towards the different positions human 
subjectivity can adopt with respect to the 
ontology of being. On the one hand there 
is an explicit treatment of the world in 
terms of thinghood, that is, in terms of 
things pregiven in order to be recognised 
by thinking consciousness. In this sense 
the universe pre-exists as substance and 
the ultimate ontology of being is thought 
to be the ontology of this substance. 
Then the facticity of human beings in the 
universe is treated as the variation of this 
substance. In this case humanity,  being 
a part of the universe, stands in a moral 
opposition to it in the sense that it  
experiences fear that the laws of the 
universe at some stage can remove the 
phenomenon of humankind from its 
surface.  On the other hand there is a 
different intuition which can be 
described as the living presence of 
personhood in all articulations of the 
universe. In other words, things which 
are out there, objects and entities in the 
universe appear not as an external and 
hostile environment but as the 
manifestation of the living presence of 
human subjectivity  in the universe 
which actually makes all these things 
beings. The making of the universe must 
not be understood as manufacturing 
things from some pre-given material, but 
rather as creating things in a rather 
different sense. By making an artificial 
object from a pregiven material, the 
underlying substance is subordinated, 
controlled and dominated by 
individualised thinking. In some sense a 
human being, who is involved in this 
kind of making, is itself transformed into 
a thing which acts with respect to 
another thing. But man as a thing is not 
man as a person, and to create in the 
sense of personhood means not to 
dominate the pregiven, but to create such 
an ontological situation where all so 
called things acquire the “presence” 
relevant to the totality of existence 
understood not in terms  
of substance but in terms of hypostasis. 
Humanity itself becomes present and 
manifestthrough transferring its 
hypostasis to being.26 This hypostasis is 
not something which ‘pre-exists’ in 
substance  or in nature, it is not an 
impersonal combination of the worldly 
elements or platonic numbers, but the 
centre and the ultimate beginning of all 
articulated existence.  
 
 The paradox of human 
subjectivity explicates the insufficiency 
of the scientific world-view (which 
functions in the natural attitude and leads 
to what Berdyaev called 
“objectification”) in appropriating the 
problem of personhood. For example, in 
modern physics and cosmology, there is 
the grandeur of the world as it is 
understood by physics: it deals with 
particles, fields, space-time, planets and 
galaxies, but there is no place for human 
subjectivity, for the only thing physics 
can speculate about is the physico-
biological functioning of human bodies.  
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Physics does not attempt to understand 
human consciousness and its hypostatic 
origin as personhood. Physics is the 
product of  thinking individuals whose 
consciousness was directed to the world, 
but the very fact that physics is possible 
at all, that is  its sheer facticity, as the 
ability to articulate the universe, is not 
understood and even not attempted to be 
understood. This happens because 
personal characteristics of those who 
create the physical picture of the world 
are remarkably missing from the very 
result of their activity. It is clear that 
personhood must be present behind the 
living presence of  the world, the 
presence which is the result of 
personhood’s creativity; at the same time 
this personhood cannot be made explicit 
in its presence. One can say that 
personhood, while being tacitly present 
behind the works of  its own creation as 
the source of this creativity, is explicitly 
absent from its own creation. The picture 
of the universe is the manifestation of 
personal presence in the universe, but 
those persons, who created the picture,  
are not explicitly found in it.  Science 
itself, by virtue of its existence, 
manifests the presence of persons in the 
universe, but in its outward content it 
creates conditions for the unconcealment 
of being in its theories, which  takes 
place at the expense of concealment of 
persons. 
 
The concealment of personhood 
can be easily illustrated by pointing out 
that the whole edifice of science, while 
being produced by particular historical 
persons represents an effort of 
anonymous and collective subjectivity 
which is not interested in contingent 
incarnations of this subjectivity in 
historical beings.  In spite of the fact that 
a scientist works in a particular historical 
situation which forms the immediate 
existential horizon, their activity is 
directed toward the infinite horizon of  
omni- and trans-temporal truth, that truth 
which is accessible in principle to 
everyone and hence this truth transcends 
the relativity of any truths achieved in a 
historical situation connected with a 
particular person. But this omni-
temporal truth, as an “infinite” task,  is 
not achievable by one particular scientist. 
This or that  scientist should participate 
in a collective activity of the many by 
submitting his individuality,  to the 
interests of the open-ended  collective of 
scientists which outlines the tradition  in 
which all scientific accomplishments 
acquire a certain  sense. It is in this sense 
that the presence of a particular scientist 
who advances a general view of reality 
is important only as a contributing factor 
to the overall tradition. Paradoxically a 
particular historical presence of this 
scientist (who is a person) is crucial for 
the advance  to be made; however his or 
her personality is not important in the 
context of the knowledge achieved, the 
knowledge which since its first 
articulation by a scientist  and its 
appropriation by a community enters so 
to speak the realm of a-temporal ideas to 
which everyone has access. One 
observes here an interesting 
transformation of personal knowledge 
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into an a-personal and anonymous 
compendium of knowledge whose 
ultimate subject is the de-personalised, 
that is  anonymous,  transcendental 
subjectivity. It is now clear why, when a 
scientific fact or a theory are 
“downloaded” on a routine basis from 
the compendium of ideas, it is 
unnecessary to enter communion with a 
person  who brought them into existence 
and who is, in a way, still present  
behind them. The memory of this person 
will enter the discourse only as labels of  
past historical discoveries and it is this 
that happens in science.  
 
At the same time, in order to 
understand science as an overall process, 
one should study its history, not as a 
chain of contingent facts and persons, 
but as the open-ended unfolding horizon 
of meanings which simultaneously 
serves as the delimiter of science. To 
understand science in  a profound 
philosophical sense one must gain an 
insight into the founding action which 
originally instituted it, into the process 
by which its concepts were created, and 
into the original spiritual motives of its 
creation. However these spiritual 
motives  are not explicitly present to  
scientific reason because personhood as 
an existential centre of these motives 
does not show itself to science: it is 
present in absence.  It is interesting to 
mention that while in their very genesis  
theories and ideas contain the traces of 
personal agencies which created them, 
their  presence is of a different kind if 
one compares it with the work of art.  In 
art, when one enjoys painting or listens 
to music one perceives the presence of 
an artist or composer in their actual 
absence: they are present only because 
they are absent. In every work of art a 
person manifests itself in its 
fundamentally irreducible originality and 
distinctiveness with respect to all 
community, including that one of artists 
themselves. Each work of art is the end 
in itself which cannot be simply used in 
order to create a consecutive piece of 
art.27 It is in this sense that the person is 
always present behind this piece of art 
and this person is essentially historical 
and concrete. The understanding of a 
masterpiece is not that algorithmic way 
of downloading scientific ideas from the 
already pre-existing world of articulated 
ideas; on the contrary the approach to a 
piece of art requires a personal effort, 
which cannot be taught and explained 
unless a direct communion with the 
“mind” of the artist is established. 
  
The absence of human 
consciousness and personhood from the 
objectivised picture of the world was in 
the history of thought qualified as the 
result of an extreme realisation of the 
rational ideal as the hegemony of 
discursive reason. Rationalism 
appropriates any personal contribution 
dissolving the presence of any personal 
insight and achievement into an 
impersonal ocean of ideas. Indeed, in 
order to formulate an idea there must be 
a person. But what is left from this 
person when the idea is formulated and 
inserted in the already articulated part of 
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the world of ideas, is just a mode of 
transcendental subjectivity which does 
not need any hypostatic specification. By 
working through logic, induction and 
dissection applied to things this 
discursive mind manifests itself in its 
natural attitude. One can qualify the 
natural attitude as such transformation of 
the totality of existence perceived 
through personhood, which corresponds 
to the disintegration  of the living and 
united presence into divisions among 
outer things allegedly existing 
independently and prior to events  of 
personhood. In simple words, the natural 
attitude promotes an ideal of objectivity, 
that is the phenomenality of objects. It is 
in this sense that in the natural attitude 
the presence of persons is not seen: they 
are still in place, but they do not show 
themselves. But it is exactly through the 
absence of personhood in science that 
the philosophical and theological reason  
can anticipate its implicit presence. The 
very fact that science is not able to 
account for personhood shows in fact the 
only possible condition of its functioning, 
namely the presence in absence of 
personhood. In a way, the objectification 
in the style of Berdyaev “mortifies” 
human beings 28  and reduces them to 
impersonal physico-biological organisms 
in order to affirm their presence by 
means of observation and rational 
induction. But personhood as existential 
event escapes any objectivistic grasp by 
transcending either materialistic 
definitions or  idealistic beliefs. 
Personhood manifests itself as an 
absolute freedom which cannot be 
subjected to any constraints of the 
pregiven matter or categories of thinking. 
This is the reason why it is  impossible 
to define personhood in the way one 
defines things. Things can be defined 
because they can be possessed, but  it is 
impossible to possess persons and  this is 
the reason why  personhood escapes any 
rational definition.   
 
 For many Russian philosophers 
who lived and worked at the end of the 
19th  and  beginning of the 20th century, 
the predicament of the objectivising 
tendencies of the natural sciences  was 
associated with  the expansion of a 
mechanistic trend in philosophy. 
According to the mechanistic view of the 
world, the universe follows some blind 
laws of nature in which human freedom 
is excluded and thus the very human 
existence is devalued and subjected to 
the necessities of the natural existence.  
In the realm of spirit, if a scientific 
worldview becomes a dominant factor in 
social development, it leads to the loss of 
religious feeling about the significance 
of humanity in the universe, and, later, to 
the loss of faith in God.   This is the 
reason why Nikolai Berdyaev 
formulated an extreme view that truth 
can hardly be found  along the lines of a 
scientific search. One has to “overcome” 
the scientific approach to knowledge of  
the world by means of its factual denial, 
in favour of searching for the 
foundations of being in religious  
philosophy and, in the long run, by 
means of developing cognitive faculties 
leading to mystical feeling and “mystical 
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thinking”. Berdyaev claimed the 
primacy of faith before knowledge: 
knowledge and science in its base 
assume faith.29  However, that faith in 
reality which is inev itable in scientific 
objective research must not be confused 
with faith in a personal God (Berdyaev 
1989, pp. 51-52). Based on this thought, 
Berdyaev  ultimately draws a borderline 
between science and religion. He has to 
admit, however, that the truths of science 
cannot contradict the wholeness of Truth 
(Berdyaev 1953, p. 44). Thus 
Berdyaev’s negative attitude to the 
scientific way of knowing was based on 
his rejection of the self-sufficiency of 
science and, as a result, on his 
conviction that one should turn to the 
foundations of science, whose 
understanding was lost in the process of 
the expansion of mechanistic  ideology. 
The search for these foundations must 
lead an attentive mind to religious 
philosophy and religion as such. 
Berdyaev argues for the restoration of 
the dignity of the person who is lost in 
the mechanistic universe and enslaved 
by the mechanism of nature. The 
liberation  of persons means the 
overcoming of their slavery to nature; 
this can only be achieved on the ways of 
religious freedom, which are available to 
persons as those centres of active and 
creative self-articulation of the world 
through which the very science becomes 
possible  (Berdyaev 1989, p. 65), 
(Berdyaev 1943, p. 96). Berdyaev insists 
that the mystery of human personhood  
is related to its dual nature:  on the one 
hand to its intrinsic natural (physical)  
necessity, and on the other hand to its 
ability to transcend  the limits of this 
nature as being an image and likeness of 
the highest being, as  a microcosm 
before whom the whole majesty of 
nature stands (Berdyaev 1989, c. 294-
96), (Berdyaev 1943, p. 81). One must 
add to this an emphatic apology of 
Berdyaev for the uniqueness of person 
and its origination from the absolute 
freedom. For example: “Personality is 
not a part and cannot be a part in relation 
to any kind of whole, not even to an 
immediate whole, or to the entire 
world….Personality is not made up of 
parts, it is not an aggregate, not a 
composition, it is a primary whole” 
(Berdyaev 1943, pp. 21, 23)30; or “the 
secret of the existence of personality lies 
in its absolute irreplaceability, its 
happening but once, its uniqueness, its 
incomparableness” (Berdyaev 1943, p.  
23)31; or “personality is connected with 
freedom from the determinism of nature, 
it is independent of the mechanism of 
nature” (Berdyaev 1943, p. 34). 32 
Berdyaev blames the science of his time 
for not being able to realise the depth of 
the problem of humanity and, according 
to him, this is why one must ascend to 
religious philosophy, which is the only 
means that can handle the problem of 
human personhood. Indeed, according to 
Berdyaev, “personality is not born of the 
family and cosmic process, not born of 
father and mother, it emanates from God, 
it makes an appearance from another 
world” (Berdyaev 1943, p. 36).33 
 
 19 
 In a way, all definitions of 
personhood formulated by the Russian 
philosophers have, so to speak, an 
apophatic character. They define 
personhood in terms of that which this 
personhood is not. And if one 
generalizes these definitions 
philosophically, one can state that 
personhood escapes definitions in terms 
of a rationality of objects: it is that 
intrinsic condition of subjectivity that 
cannot be alienated and detached from 
the very acts of knowing consciousness 
as such. However personhood manifests 
those feature of consciousness which as 
such are given to a subject as primary 
conditions of its existence at all. That is 
personhood characterizes not simply a 
dynamic of conscious life, but its 
ontology. The question that remains is 
whether personhood can be 
characterized constructively in terms of 
those definitions which themselves do 
not produce an infinite hermeneutics. As 
we will see this can be done only by 
employing a theological modus of 
cognition and reflection positioning 
personhood within the scope of such 
notions as freedom and God.  However, 
the ascent to the theological 
comprehension of personhood can be 
performed, not through an appeal to 
religious faith  and dogma, but through a 
careful philosophical insight, based in a 
phenomenological suspension of any 
judgments about  objectivity in the 
positive sciences and bringing their 
alleged object of study in the interior of 
the human subjectivity. 
 
 
 Since the essence of personhood 
cannot be exhausted by discursive 
reason it is obvious that scientific 
methods are fundamentally insufficient 
in order to deal with the problem of 
personhood. However, this does not 
mean that persons disappear from 
scientific discourse completely; on the 
contrary, they reveal their inescapable 
presence in a rather dramatic way. This 
happens because humanity as 
personhood is not content with the 
presence of any beings in the world as 
they are given to it empirically and 
studied only scientifically. Humanity 
attempts to understand the underlying 
meaning of things not only through their 
“nature”,  in the phenomenality of 
objects, but through the purposes and 
ends of these beings as they stand with 
respect to the place and goals of 
humanity in creation. In other words, the 
underlying impetus of the objective 
representation of nature is still purely 
subjective, for it originates in the 
anxieties of existence with their 
questions of “where we come from and 
where we go?” as well as “what is the 
meaning of all that surrounds us?” 
Definitely, the response to such a 
question cannot be expressed physically 
and biologically; ultimately it is 
sustained by humanity’s ideals and 
religious aspirations, which portray man 
as the crown of creation made in the 
image of God. This is the reason why in 
a God-like fashion humanity wants to 
recognise its own being not according to 
 20 
its compelling givenness, but as results 
of  humanity’s free will 34 , that is 
according to its major dimension of 
being made in the image of God, that is 
freedom. Also it is by subjugating that 
truth which is gained on the grounds of 
the scientific, to the desire for the truth 
of existence originating in communion 
with the hypostatic archetype of the 
image, that humanity exhibits its own 
hypostatic essence, that is its personhood. 
Personhood remains an ideal of life  
aiming to remove all constraints on the 
confession of love while being doomed 
to its own incapacity to achieve truly 
personal life. As a resistance and protest 
against such an incapacity humanity 
does not want to be manipulated through 
circumscribability and individualisation 
which are inherent in spatio-temporal 
forms of creation. Correspondingly 
human persons long for the truth of 
existence which is in this world but not 
of this world. This longing forms 
spiritual motives of humanity and points 
toward the telos of all creaturehood, in 
which the paradox of personal existence  
will be finally resolved. This 
eschatological sentiment, in fact, implies 
that the actual and the only real 
contradiction in the world’s being, that is, 
“the contradiction of self-consciousness 
and life in being of human person”, 
cannot be removed or solved in physical 
time. As V. Nesmelov writes   even “if 
the world would become known to man 
through development of the positive 
sciences, the factual contradiction  of 
man’s being still will not be removed 
and hence the making sense of this 
contradiction will constitute for him  a 
great mystery of being” (Nesmelov 1905, 
p. 242).35  
  
 The accentuation of personhood 
as an escape from the circumscribability 
of the human phenomenon through 
scientific rationalism, de facto implies a 
phenomenological reduction leading to 
rediscovery of the life-world as the core 
and basis of the indwelling in the world. 
This rediscovery, as a phenomenological 
reversal,  means the inclusion of the 
objectivized world inside man’s 
subjectivity. As expressed by  N. 
Berdyaev, “man ought to rebel against 
the slavery of history not for the sake of 
finding isolation within its own self, but 
in order to take all history into his own 
infinite subjectivity, in which the world 
is part of man” (Berdyaev 1943, p. 
267).36 The phenomenological reduction 
here is the suspension of the naivety of 
the  primacy of the objective world as 
uncontrollable history, and acceptance of 
this history as unfolding according to the 
teleology of the human spirit.  Such a 
reduction in turn would imply the return 
to the study of the foundations of the 
sciences as intrinsically anthropic 
enterprises. Thus the disappearance of 
personhood  in the scientific picture of 
the world will be subjected to a 
phenomenological reversal in order to 
explicate those intentionalities of human 
subjectivity which led to the 
development of contemporary science, 
and, behind these intentionalities, real 
living persons who initiated this 
development. This shift in the attitude of 
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treating the sciences as not delivering 
passive reflections upon the realities of 
the surrounding world,  but as those 
activities of  human subjectivity which 
attempt to constitute personhood, can in 
turn take place only in the paradoxical 
condition of personhood discussed above. 
Viktor Nesmelov describes this situation 
in the following words: “…any man’s 
attempt to fulfill the natural content of 
his personhood on the ways of the 
physical development of life necessarily 
contains in itself an unsolvable intrinsic 
contradiction and naturally does not lead 
man to anything” (Nesmelov 1905, p. 
243). 37  Indeed, if one considers the 
development of persons physically and 
biologically, that is through processes 
uncovered by the sciences,  then one 
deals only with the aspects of their 
embodiment, rather than the integrity of 
the balance between the physical and the 
properly intellectual and spiritual.  
However, as Nesmelov continues, “with 
all respect to  its great success in the 
cultural transformation of reality man 
remains… no more than a simple thing 
in the world that emerges and decays 
only because  of the necessary laws of 
physical nature and therefore exists 
under the form of personhood without 
understanding the sense and meaning of 
this existence” (Nesmelov 1905, p. 
243).38 The sciences as such manifest the 
existence of persons as their creators 
through the sheer complexity of 
scientific theories. However, why the 
sciences are possible at all, remains 
incomprehensible to the same extent as 
the sense and meaning of existence of 
personhood.  Correspondingly if the 
attitude to the sciences changes, that is if 
they are approached not from the point 
of view of the content of their theories 
and alleged references to the physical 
world, but treated as  hermeneutical 
tools  for understanding  humanity itself 
(using the human image of the universe 
as a mirror through which human 
subjectivity and persons constitute 
themselves), the sense of the sciences 
can be reversed: they can now be seen as 
those activities of the human self that 
through its outward look establishes 
itself and brings  out (according to its 
free will) personhood to its explicit 
manifestation. The phenomenological 
reversal  of   such constructs as the 
universe (which served the naturally 
oriented mind to be an ultimate objective 
background of all facticity of life), 
acquires a status of a structure of 
transcendental consciousness whose 
incarnate facticity follows the logic of 
existential events and cannot be reduced 
to anything that is more primary than 
these events.  If, in the natural attitude, 
science affirms the explicit presence of 
the universe at the expense of 
disappearance of personhood, in the 
philosophical attitude the universe, as an 
intentional correlate of human 
subjectivity, does not possess qualities of 
“out there”, that is  of  presence as any 
other thing. The universe in all its 
entirety is en-hypostasised by human 
beings; but since the entirety of the 
universe is not available to our grasp, 
this very en-hypostasisation turns out to 
be no more than the manifestation of the 
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universe’s presence but in its actual 
absence. This result is not surprising, for 
as personhood escapes complete 
definition by reason, manifesting itself 
only through its tacit presence, the 
universe, being de facto a mirror of the 
human reason also escapes complete 
definition.  
 
Personhood and Overcoming of 
Solitude  
 
Russian philosophers understood well 
that no accomplished definition of 
personhood is possible, and that the 
problems and contradictions in the 
foundation of any definitions would be 
explicit characteristics of that which 
personhood is. According to V. 
Nesmelov, the main ambiguity of 
personal existence originates from the 
limited being of man and the human 
image of the unconditional being: “all 
particular contradictions of thought and 
life arise from man’s aspiration to fulfil 
the ideal image of the unconditional in 
the necessary boundaries of the external 
conditions” (Nesmelov 1905, p. 246)39.  
However, since this aspiration cannot be 
accomplished, the main ambiguity of 
man’s being not only cannot be removed 
but, on the contrary, is revealed to him 
ever more clearly as eternally 
irremovable, because it is along this way 
that man realizes its position in the 
world as a thing among other things. The 
image of the unconditional being thus 
constitutes the image of man as an 
unconditional essence in spite of the fact 
that it remains a simple thing in the 
physical world.  The assertion of the 
personhood of man thus becomes a 
strange procedure from an 
epistemological and spiritual point of 
view, because in its affirmation of the 
affinity to the absolute and unconditional 
being humans understand that they can 
never achieve the state of existence of 
this unconditional being. But this 
strangeness exactly becomes a basic 
characteristic of personhood and its 
problematic status. Correspondingly, to 
aspire to personhood in thought and 
actual life, means, de facto, to deal with 
its mystery, which at the same time,  is 
the mystery of being in general. Then the 
unconditional character of personhood, 
being placed in constant contradiction 
with conditional being in the world, 
evokes thinking of the Divine 
(Nesmelov 1905, p. 261). Man as a 
person can  only be an unconditional 
being: this is the “fact” which man 
knows through knowing himself. The 
person  asserts itself as a free agent of its 
own volition and this mode of being is 
called by Nesmelov as absolute and 
unconditional: “only an unconditional 
being can be a person; every man is 
directly aware of this and truly knows 
this through knowing of himself” 
(Nesmelov 1905, p. 264)40   The human 
person represents that link, or pole of 
being,  where the unconditional and 
conditional meet. Here Nesmelov again 
points to the vanity of all scientific 
attempts to “explain” personhood in its 
incarnate conditions. In its displayed 
givenness  it can be studied, but the fact 
of its existence, as a real fact, can only 
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be interpreted through the help of the 
Bible, in which  the existence of man is 
posed as a fact of the relationship 
between God and the world. It is the 
mystery of the facticity of personal 
beings that leads all philosophy and 
science to the idea of the free creation of 
persons by God, persons which sustain 
that mode of being from within which 
the disclosure and manifestation of the 
universe take place. As Nesmelov writes:  
  
 “But existing as a person and, at 
the same time, as an ordinary thing of 
the physical world linked necessarily to 
the mechanism of external conditions, 
man is not an unconditional being, but 
only expresses in itself the real link 
between conditional and unconditional 
being…   If scientific thought had  not 
denied this mysterious fact through its 
pseudo-scientific explanations, but had  
truly contemplated it as an 
incomprehensible fact of being,  perhaps 
long ago scientific thought would have 
come to the Biblical vision of humanity 
as made in the image of God. This could 
be possible because the existence of man 
as an image of Absolute Being can be 
established strictly scientifically and 
independently of the Bible just from the 
psychological analysis of  the nature and 
content of human person, so that one can 
appeal to the Bible not with the purpose 
of extracting from it this very doctrine, 
but only in order to find in it the 
explanation of the real fact. Both the 
objective being of God, as well as true 
knowledge of his nature are directly 
given to man through the real being and 
natural content of its own personhood. 
But why and how is human person as the 
real image of God possible within 
conditional being, - this we do not know 
and cannot know, so that the Bible tells 
us about the creation of man by the will 
of God” (Nesmelov 1905, pp. 264-65).41  
 
 Let us accentuate the important 
aspect of Nesmelov’s thought: the very 
assertion of personhood as a sheer fact 
while other facts take place from within 
human life, which reflects upon itself 
and finds in itself the irreducible 
presence of some absoluteness and 
freedom which are not determined by the 
external conditions. The presence of the 
absolute in human consciousness is a 
fact. The usage of the language of fact 
(in contradistinction, for example with 
the language of objects) position the 
existence of persons in the category of 
events, whose phenomenality can never 
be exhausted through the representation 
of objects and represents that puzzle for 
human consciousness which this 
consciousness cannot comprehend but is 
itself constituted by this puzzle. Put 
bluntly, personhood is given to human 
persons themselves as such a 
phenomenon, which can never be 
presented in the phenomenality of 
objects, because personhood entails the 
image of the infinite absolute being that 
also can not be represented in the 
phenomenality of objects. Nesmelov 
insists that the fact of existence of man, 
the reality of its very being, de facto, 
justifies the idea of God, and that the 
two-fold hypostatic constitution of man, 
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justifies knowledge of God (Nesmelov 
1905, p. 266). In a way, the inherent 
sense of the Divine which justifies 
religious experience, faith, theology, as 
well as all other modes of the human 
activity, proceeds from the fact of life, 
that is the existence of human persons. 
But the fact of the existence of persons is 
inferred by man exactly because 
personhood cannot be realised under the 
form of representation. Person poses 
itself as free with regard to the cause and 
goal of its actions, so that it affirms itself 
not through the physical law of 
mechanical necessity, but through the 
trans-sensible principle of  the 
reasonable foundation. Correspondingly 
the trans-sensible being is known to man 
through the immediate consciousness of 
being and the content of his own 
personhood (Nesmelov 1905, p. 268): 
“In knowledge of ourselves we know 
truly, that although our own person 
exists only in the necessary conditions  
of the physical world, by its own nature 
it manifests   not the world, but the true 
nature of the very Infinite and 
Unconditional, because the infinite and 
unconditional is free being for itself, but 
free being for itself is and can be only 
being of the self-existing Person” 
(Nesmelov 1905, p. 269).42  
 
 The question then is how the 
meaning of personhood can be 
explicated in, so to speak,  “practical” 
terms. In other words, what can be an 
existential objective of human beings in 
order to realise their personhood, that is 
the image of the unconditional and 
absolute, in the conditions of necessities 
of nature. Nesmelov points towards 
moral consciousness as that 
characteristic of spiritual and personal 
existence which leads man not to the 
idea and knowledge of life as the good, 
but life as truth. Nesmelov writes:  
 “What is expressed through the 
content of the moral consciousness is 
exactly a natural self-determination of  a 
human person in the conditions of its 
physical existence. It is that moral for  
man which must be fulfilled by him; but 
man must fulfill that which is truly 
human, then it is that truly human  which 
expresses by itself the true nature of the 
human person independently of the 
conditions, interests and goals of its 
physical existence” (Nesmelov 1905, p. 
287).43   
 
 Moral consciousness is that one 
which seeks the determination of the 
sense of personal existence 
independently of the natural conditions 
of existence of this person in the 
physical universe. However, it is exactly 
this real living in the world in 
accordance with moral consciousness as 
such, that becomes impossible; it 
remains no more than a representation of 
the moral consciousness: “…the point is 
exactly that, that true life whose 
existence man grasps through moral  
consciousness, in fact, cannot be realized 
because  man exists not only as a free 
agent in the world, but as a simple thing 
of the world, a thing which is 
subordinated to the general laws of the 
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physical existence” (Nesmelov 1905, pp. 
287-88).44  
 
 This negative assertion of man’s 
incapacity to fulfill his humanness 
according to the ideal of moral 
consciousness  has, so to speak, a 
positive dimension, for it is through the 
impossibility of achieving the ideal of 
moral consciousness and humanness as 
free from the conditions of the physical, 
that human person asserts itself as an 
image of the absolute personal being (Cf. 
Nesmelov 1905, pp. 288). On a level of 
practical existence, however, the gap 
between the ideal and desirable on the 
one hand, and the impossibility of 
achieving freedom from the necessities 
of the world on the other hand, creates a 
feeling of ontological solitude that 
remains an inerasable sign of the 
typically human existence. The presence 
of this sign and the possibility of its 
articulation and manifestation both point 
towards the image of the absolute and 
unconditional in the human person. 
Nesmelov concludes that “the ultimate 
result of the science of man is the 
irresolvable mystery of his existence; 
how could man appear in the world 
whereas by the essence of his 
personhood he denies the world, and as 
such he is in turn denied by the world?” 
(Nesmelov 1905, p. 372). 45   In a 
different pasaage Nesmelov reasserts 
this point:  “all man’s deliberate virtue, 
in fact, rests only in his disdain of the 
world and its denial, and not at all in his 
desire to unfold in it and by its means 
the truth of the moral order and through 
this unfolding to reflect in the world the 
life of the Absolute Person” (Nesmelov 
1905, p. 391).46   
 
 Correspondingly, if such a denial 
of the world is effected, man cannot 
have any meaning   in this world and 
thus  involuntarily mentally displaces 
himself into a different unknown world, 
still with no hope to reach that world 
existentially, remaining under the spell 
of its overwhelming lure, distracting 
himself from the humble and 
dispassionate acceptance of the gift of 
life on this planet.   
 
 In the reciprocal  denial of the 
world by man, and man by the world,  
the sense of the non-attunement and 
homelessness, as well as of ontological 
solitude, is constituted in man with no 
hope to find consolation either in this 
world or in any imaginable realm of the 
created. The search for the hope of 
finding the sense of existence is then 
transferred to the realm of that absolute 
and unconditional which reveals itself 
vividly in the anxieties of existence. But 
even if God comes to mind as a savoir 
and guarantor of the ultimate sense of 
existence, in its physical life man does 
not reach its destined place, so that his 
faith in that he occupies a very selected 
and special place in creation remains 
only a matter of his eschatological 
conviction with no possible justification 
on the grounds of reason. Reason 
becomes redundant as a practical tool of 
solving the mystery of the human 
existence so that faith has to replace it 
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but not as an epistemological sentiment, 
but as a way of existence as such.   
  
 The denial of the world on the 
grounds of asserting personhood 
effectively means that when man talks 
about person he intuits and contemplates 
his own personal existence as something 
which cannot be formalised and 
expressed in the phenomenality of 
objects. In this sense the very assertion 
of personhood as an exclusively human 
feature immediately positions humanity 
beyond the world of objects. But, 
remaining a thing among other things, 
man is disturbed by this strange 
contradiction that not everything that is 
in man can be known and understood on 
the grounds of personal reason. There is 
something in the human condition which 
escapes all understanding and thus 
effectively retaining the very 
phenomenon  of humanity to be 
unknown to man himself. In fact the 
very denial of the world means not less 
than the impossibility  to know the world 
and its meaning in the condition of not 
being able to know what is man. The 
mystery of the human existence and its 
ambiguous standing in the world, as it 
was explicated by the Russian 
philosophers, ultimately means that man 
is brought into existence exactly subject 
to the condition that he cannot be known 
to himself. In a contemporary parlance it 
is exactly this paradox that constitutes 
man’s phenomenality consisting in that 
man can be shown to himself in such a 
way that he cannot be known to himself.  
 
 Definitely Russian religious 
philosophers were not the first ones who 
had to reaffirm the premise of the 
unknowability of man to himself. If one 
refers to the Biblical account of creation 
of man in Genesis, one finds that Adam 
is given a privilege of naming, 
understanding and dominating the world 
of all non-living and living things. 
However the first man-Adam exercises 
this privilege only upon the animals, 
never upon God, and, what is more 
interesting,  not upon himself. The fact 
that any attempt to define God always 
fails can easily be conceived  by 
remembering that God is the Creator of 
all, so that he cannot be comprehended 
by man, that is by a creature, who is, 
ontologically distant from God, and for 
whom the mystery of his own creation is 
existentially and epistemologically 
inaccessible.  The question is why man 
does not exercise the privilege of naming 
and hence comprehending himself. The 
answer comes from the detailed Biblical 
account of what is man and how he was 
created: among all living creatures man 
alone was created not according to 
various kinds of living creatures 
(including man himself) but “in the 
image” and “after the likeness” of God 
(Gen. 1:24, 26). Man remains unnamable, 
that is not being able to be defined in 
terms of other things and species, that is 
in terms of objects which fall under a 
sort of classification, because he is 
created, that is formed and constituted in 
the image of God who admits no 
creaturely image, and whose proper 
names are beyond any denomination.  
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Man as image of the Personal God, 
being a hypostatic creature, is infinitely 
distant from anything which he names 
and articulates. Thus man resembles 
nothing in creation, because he 
resembles God whose proper names are 
unknown.  God being incomprehensible 
and beyond any measure with the 
created, transfers this proper quality to 
man who thus resembles him by  having 
the privilege of God’s 
incomprehensibility. This means that 
manhood exceeds any possible definition, 
be it anthropological or psychological 
definitions, or any classification of 
human beings among other beings. Man 
appears to himself and to the other 
immediately within the image of the 
Absolute and Unconditioned God who 
surpasses all manifestations of his  light 
to man. Incomprehensibility of man as 
incapacity of his own understanding 
makes him invisible, not because of the 
lack of light of the Divine in him, but 
because of its insurmountable excess 
originating from God himself. Man is 
thus radically separated from every other 
being in the world by a definitive 
difference that is not any longer only 
ontological47, but iconic. This intuition 
can be found in St. Gregory of Nyssa:  
 “The image [eikon] is properly 
an image [eikon] so long as it fails in 
none of those attributes which we 
perceive in the archetype . . . therefore, 
since one of the attributes we 
contemplate in the Divine nature is 
incomprehensibility of essence, it is 
clearly necessary that in this point the 
image [eikon] should be able to show its 
imitation of the archetype. For if, while 
the archetype transcends comprehension, 
the nature of the image [eikon] were 
comprehended, the contrary character of 
the attributes we behold in them would 
prove the defect of the image [eikon]; 
but since the nature of our mind, which 
is  the likeness [eikon] of the Creator, 
evades our knowledge, it has an accurate 
resemblance to the superior nature, 
figuring by its own unknowableness the   
incomprehensible Nature.”48 
 
 To know man thus requires 
referring them to the incomprehensible 
God and thus by grounding man’s 
incomprehensibility in the 
Incomprehensible, by virtue of man’s 
being its image and likeness. St. 
Augustine, makes a similar observation 
that man can be known only by God: 
“yet there is something of the human 
person which is unknown even to the 
‘spirit of man which is in him.’ But you, 
Lord, know everything about the human 
person; for you made humanity”. If man 
realizes this fact of its own 
incomprehensibility, its own ignorance 
of himself is to be transformed through 
confession towards God’s knowledge of 
myself: “Accordingly, let me confess 
what I know of myself. Let me confess 
too what I do not know of myself. For 
what I know of myself I know because 
you grant me light, and what I do not 
know of myself, I do not know until 
such time as my darkness becomes ‘like 
noonday’ before your face.”49 Man as a 
thing  of the world is infinitely distant 
from man as a hypostasis of the universe. 
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It is this intrinsic split in his 
consciousness as an infinite difference of 
man from himself that he cannot 
comprehend, and which, probably he 
should not comprehend.50  
 
 Their own incomprehensibility 
tells man that he goes beyond and 
exceeds himself: man passes beyond and 
above his own physical means. They 
have to conclude that only the infinite 
and incomprehensible can comprehend 
man, and thus tell him of and show him 
to himself; only God can reveal man to 
man, because man only reveals himself 
by revealing, without knowing it, the one 
whose image he bears.  If this image is 
obscured or abandoned (in favor of the 
objectivity of man according to some 
worldly laws and paradigms), man can 
no longer appear in the proper context of 
their predestined humanity, but disfigure 
themselves by  attempting to refer their 
“image” to something other than 
themselves, that is by allowing 
themselves to resemble something other 
than God. And this constitutes the 
definition of sin: man thinks he attains 
unto himself by choosing to resemble 
less than God. It is this dissimilarity with 
the image that devalues man making 
them devoid of God so that man loses 
the human face as an icon of God: man’s 
soul  “is not sufficient to itself, nor is 
anything at all sufficient to him, who 
departs from Him, who is alone 
sufficient”.51 
 
 One now can conjecture that 
man’s solitude in the world is de facto 
their own existence in the conditions of 
the inherent incapacity to know 
themselves and then to know the sense 
of life. While attempting to verbalize 
this unknowability man discovers the 
paradox and  contradiction of their 
condition, that contradiction which 
constitutes ultimately the content of the 
only mystery in the world. According to 
Nesmelov this mystery is not reduced to 
our present ignorance or principal 
inability in the future to know about the 
existence of God as the absolute 
archetype of man as person. Even if this 
knowledge could be acquired on the 
ways of spiritual life and communion 
with God, the question would remain as 
to why, by having such a knowledge, 
man cannot live in accordance with it. 
Even if every man realized himself as an 
image of God, this sense of being from 
God entirely contradicts to the actual 
existence of man as a simple thing in this 
world.  Then the question of how to 
alleviate this contradiction, or how to 
avoid the existential incertitude and the 
feeling of solitude, homelessness and 
non-attunement to being, the anxiety and 
non-sense of being born into this world 
without knowing why and for what 
purpose, can only be to appeal to 
Christianity (which recognizes this 
mystery and proposes to solve it on the 
grounds of practice, rather than theory), 
assuming that it indeed inheres in itself 
the potential of that which makes the 
hope for the resolution of the paradox 
(Nesmelov 1905, p. 418). This is the 
reason why, according to Nesmelov, 
“man aspires not only to the explanation 
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of his position in the world, but also to 
knowledge of that way through which he 
could indeed overcome this position… 
To reach knowledge  of the eternal 
mystery of being means the same as to 
de facto remove this mystery in being, 
that is to produce the true way for 
accomplishment by man of his destiny in 
the world and give him true possibility 
for the accomplishment of this destiny. It 
is about this way and this possibility that 
Christian teaching tells  man. It 
communicates to man that knowledge 
without which man cannot manage, but 
which he, unfortunately, cannot create” 
(Nesmelov 1905, pp. 409-410).52   
 
Instead of Conclusion 
 
Now one can attempt a generalisation 
from what we have discussed above. 
Humanity’s sense of existence can be 
described in terms of three equivalent 
ways: as existence in solitude, as 
existence with no sense, as existence 
whose meaning can never be known 
(understood). On the level of human 
psychology this leads to fear of both life 
and death, that fear which enslaves 
humanity and chains it to its earthly fate 
whose major feature is the concealment 
of truth not only in an abstract sense but, 
first of all on the level of existence and 
action. According to Russian 
philosophers the slavery to the fear of 
death cascading towards society, politics 
and economics, perpetuates death to an 
ever greater extent. 53   Berdyaev still 
refers this post-lapserian atavism to the 
underscoring of personhood, its under-
development and overall impotence of 
man to reach its fullness. He identifies 
this insufficiency of man with his 
finitude which emerges when the 
manifestation of the Unconditional 
Absolute in him is dimmed because of 
slavery to death. Berdyaev advocates for 
the rediscovery of infinity and eternity in 
the hidden propensity of the Fallen 
humanity, that propensity which is still 
archetypically present through the 
impetus of  restoration of the Divine 
Image (Berdyaev 1943, p. 251). Here the 
impetus finds its fulfilment in creativity 
as manifestation of freedom: “Victory 
over death cannot be evolution, cannot 
be a result of necessity. Victory over 
death is creativeness, the united 
creativeness of man and God, it is a 
result of freedom” (Berdyaev 1943, p. 
252).54 Creativity as freedom brings man 
to an ecstatic exit from time towards an 
instantaneous synthesis of being where 
all modalities of space (generating the 
sense of loneliness and solitude) and 
time (perpetuating despair) are 
suspended and the human spirit achieves 
a climax in its practical imitation of it 
Creator – he creates novelty in art, in the 
human reality and in the world itself. 
Creativity as freedom, as the overcoming 
of the solitude, non-sense and 
incomprehensibility of existence, makes 
a breakthrough from this world to a new 
and transfigured world. And the very 
possibility of this break into the other 
world is inherent in the  God-given 
possibility for a symphonic and creative 
economy in this world as good creation 
by the Good God. The fulfillment of 
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personood is a constant transcendence of 
the mundane and self-evident, the 
overcoming of the constraints and 
slavery to the rubrics of the incarnate 
existence in this physical world. It is in 
this movement that the sense of solitude 
and despair disappears because the 
whole of the human history, as well as 
the whole universe, are brought inside 
the infinite and incomprehensible  
subjectivity of  man in the image of the 
Divine. Thus freedom and creativity 
imply such a transformation in the vision 
of the world (as a vast and nonsensical 
universe) where human personhood 
acquires back its central place in the 
universe. But this is an ideal of 
Godmanhood so heartedly fostered by 
practically all Russian religious 
philosophers. Here philosophy inevitably 
merges with the theology of deification 
that demands a different approach to the 
present subject matter that exceeds the 
objectives and scope of this article. All 
those Russian philosophers quoted in 
this paper expressed a deep thought and 
care for man, the world and God. They 
were looking for the consolation of the 
soul of all humanity from within a 
limited historical period in the 20th 
century’s history full of apostasy and 
demonic inhumanity, causing the lament 
of the whole created universe. Their 
hymnology to man is the perennial 
attempt to affirm this world as still 
imbued with faith, hope and love.   
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1 In this paper we use English translations of Russian philosophers, either already translated in different 
editions, or translated by us. In order to preserve an academic vigor and give a chance to the reader to 
experience all depth of the Russian philosophical language, we also provide the original text in Russian 
with a corresponding reference by denoting it RO - Russian Original.      
2 RO: «Всякая жизнь  стремится подняться над землей и неизбежно вновь на нее ниспадает, 
смешиваясь с прахом; а крылья, на которых она взлетает, оказываются лишь прозрачной и 
исчезающей поэтической прикрасою» (Трубецкой 1922, с. 34). 
3  RO: «Именно личности глубоко присуще состояние ужаса и тоски. Человек чувствует себя 
существом висящим над бездной и именно в человеке, как личности, оторвавшемся от 
первоначальной коллективности, это чувство достигает особенной остроты» (Бердяев 1939, с. 45). 
 
4  Emphasis added. RO: «Наша “душа”, наше “я” испытывает некую присущую ей нужду и 
недостаточность, некий имманентный трагизм своего существования.... [в той мере как] она вообще 
достигает подлинного  самосознания,  она роковым образом сознает свое одиночество, свою 
бесприютность  в составе объективной действительности, в которой она обречена соучаствовать и 
которой она в значительной мере подчинена» (Франк 1997, с. 180-81) (курсив наш, АН).  
5 “Le silence éternel des ces espaces infinis m’effraie” (Pascal 1962, p. 110).  
6   RO: «Тоска устремлена вверх и обличает высшую природу человека» (Бердяев 1939,  c. 45). 
7 Modern cosmology persuasively demonstrates that the spatial volume of man’s location in the universe on 
the planet Earth constantly decreases due to the fact that at the level of clusters of galaxies the universe 
expands with acceleration. A typical scale of the human embodiment does not change for it is determined 
by the gravitational forces responsible for the stability of the geocentric environment.     
8   RO: «Познающий субъект лишен всякого внутреннего существования, не имеет точки опоры в 
бытии, он существует лишь в отношении производимой им объективации» (Бердяев 2003[1], c. 53). 
9 It is in this context that S. Bulgakov qualified science as a kind of economy which human being is 
doomed to deal with because of its condition: “Man stands in an economic relation to nature, holding a tool 
in one hand and the flaming torch of knowledge in the other. He must struggle for his life, that is, engage in 
economic activity. Science is also born in this struggle, it is its instrument and outcome” (Bulgakov 2000, 
p. 166). (RO: «Человек стоит в хозяйственной позе по отношению к природе, с рабочим 
инструментом в одной руке, с пламенеющим светочем знания в другой. Он должен бороться за 
свою жизнь, т.е. вести хозяйство. Наука родится тоже в этой борьбе, есть ее орудие и порождение» 
(Булгаков 1993, с. 182)). In another passage Bulgakov writes: “Science is an attribute of man, his tool, 
which he creates for one or another task. Science is thoroughly anthropological and, insofar as actuality and 
economy in labor is the essential nerve of human history, science is also economic, or pragmatic. In order 
to understand science we must understand man.”(Ibid.,  p. 172) (RO: «Наука есть атрибут человека, его 
орудие, которое он создает для тех или иных задач. Наука насквозь антропологична, и насколько 
трудовая актуальность и хозяйственность есть основной нерв человеческой истории, то наука и 
хозяйственна и прагматична» (Там же, с. 188)). 
10 RO: «Космос, человечество, нация и пр. находятся в человеческой личности, как в 
индивидуализированном универсуме или микрокосме и  выпадение, выбрасывание  их во внешние 
реальности, в объекты, есть результат падшести человека, подчинения его безличной реальности, 
экстериоризации, отчуждению» (Бердяев 1939,  с. 37).   
11 RO: «Никакой целостности, тоталитарности, универсальности вне личности нет, есть лишь в 
личности, вне ее есть лишь частичный,  объективированный мир» (Бердяев 1939,  с. 37).  
 
12   RO: «трудовым восстановлением идеального космоса  как организма идей или идеальных 
закономерностей, гармонично сочетающих космические силы или формирующих первоматерию и 
первоэнергию, «праматерь» бытия. В этом процессе «наука проникает через кору и толщу хао-
космоса к идеальному космосу, космосу-Софии» (Булгаков  1993, с. 211). 
13  RO: «орудие оживления мира, победы и самоутверждения жизни» (Булгаков  1993, с. 192). 
14The abovementioned paradox was coined by E. Husserl as “the paradox of human subjectivity being a 
subject for the world and at the same time being an object in the world”  (Husserl 1970, p. 179). The 
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paradox received numerous formulations and interpretation by many philosophers, including such names as 
M. Merleau-Ponty, R. Ingarden M. Scheler and others. See (Carr 1999). See also my paper (Nesteruk 2014).  
15 Oration 45, On Easter, 7 [ET: (Nellas 1997, p. 203)]. 
16 Maximus the Confessor, Ambigua 41, [PG 91, 1304-1312B], [ET: (Nellas 1997, p. 212)]. 
17 Maximus the Confessor, Ambigua 10:26, [PG  91, 1153B],  [ET: “Various Texts on Theology, the Divine 
Economy, and Virtue and Vice”  5:71,  in The Philokalia, v. 2, p. 277]. 
18 RO: «Современный человек сознает себя внутренне свободным, сознает себя выше всякого 
внешнего, от него не зависящего начала, утверждает себя центром всего и между тем в 
действительности является только одной бесконечно малой точкой на мировой окружности…С 
одной стороны, человек есть существо с безусловным значением, с безусловными правами и 
требованиями, и тот же человек есть только ограниченное и преходящее явление, факт среди 
множества других фактов, со всех сторон ими ограниченный и от них зависящий, - и не только 
отдельный человек, но и все человечество…» (Соловьев 1989, с. 21). 
 
19 RO: «Человек совмещает в себе всевозможные противоположности, которые все сводятся к одной 
великой противоположности между безусловным и условным, между абсолютною и вечною 
сущностью и преходящим явлением, или видимостью. Человек есть вместе и божество и 
ничтожество» (Соловьев 1989, с. 113). 
20  RO: «В личности есть природные основы, связанные с космическим круговоротом. Но личное в 
человеке иного происхождения и качества и всегда означает разрыв с природной 
необходимостью...Человек,  как личность, не есть часть природы, он несет в себе образ Бога. В 
человеке есть природа, но он не есть природа. Человек – микрокосм и потому он не есть часть 
космоса» (Бердяев 1939, с. 81) Compare with an analogous assertion of S. Frank: “…man, though 
forming part of ‘this world’, transcends it, for he has another, non-worldly aspect which differentiates him 
from this this world…” (Frank  1965, p. 110), or “ …Man is an entity capable of withdrawing from all that 
exists as a fact (including his own actual existence), of considering it from outside and determining its 
relation to something other, which is more convincing to him and is primary and authoritative” (Ibid., pp. 
111-12) (RO: «…человек, также входя в состав «этого» мира и в нем соучаствуя, одновременно 
возвышается над ним, имея в себе иную, сверхмирную инстанцию», или  «Человек есть существо, 
обладающее способностью дистанцироваться от всего, что фактически есть, - в том числе и от 
дейстивтельности себя самого – смотреть на все фактически сущее извне и определеить его 
отношение к чему-то иному, более для него убедительному, авторитетному, первичному» (Франк  
1997, с. 202, 204)). 
21 RO: «Положение человека в природном мире трагическое. Человек не только один из объектов 
этого мира, он прежде всего субъект, из объекта невыводимый. Вместе с тем отношение человека к 
космосу определяется тем, что он есть микрокосм, он заключает в себе космос или заключает в себе 
всю историю….. Через духовное в себе начало человек не подчинен природе и независим от нее, 
хотя природные силы могут его убит [ср. Паскаль, АН]… Он раб природы и царь природы» 
(Бердяев 2003[2], с. 588). 
22   RO: «И природа и человек бесконечны; и по бесконечности своей, как равномощные, могут быть 
частями самих себя, причем части равномощны между собою и целым. Человек- в мире, но человек 
так же сложен, как и мир. Мир в человеке, но и мир также сложен, как и человек» (Флоренский  
1994, с. 186).  
23 RO: «..человек есть сумма Мира, сокращенный конспект его; Мир есть раскрытие Человека, 
проекция его» (Флоренский  1994, с. 187).  
24  Translation from the Russian is substantially corrected.  RO: «Человек есть, с одной стороны, 
потенциально все, потенциальный центр антропо-космоса, хотя и не реализованного еще, но 
реализуемого, а с другой стороны – он есть продукт этого мира, этой эмпирии» (Булгаков 1993, с. 
160). 
25  RO: «Через свое тело и плотскую жизнь, через внешний, наружный слой своей душевной жизни, 
определенной связью с телом, человек есть сам часть “объективной действительности”, часть 
“мира”, в котором и из которого он рождается и в котором пребывает…. Через свои глубины – через 
ядро или корень своего бытия и в этом смысле через свое подлинное существо – он принадлежит к 
составу сверхмирной первичной реальности (в которой, как мы видели, укоренен и из которой в 
конечном счете проистекает и сам мир…). Человек есть, таким образом, двухсоставное существо, и 
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всякое учение о жизни, которое не учитывало бы одновременно этих двух сторон человеческого 
бытия, было бы неадекватно его подлинному существу…Структура нашего бытия сложна, 
антиномична, и всякое ее искусственное упрощение и схематизация искажают ее» (Франк 1997, с. 
70-71). 
26 Compare with Berdyaev’s assertions that “the cosmos, mankind, society, are in personality  and not the 
 other way around ” (Berdyaev 1943, p. 38; see also pp. 42, 135) (RO: «космос, человеческтво, общество 
находятся в личности, а не наоборот» (Бердяев 1939, с. 34; см. также с. 37, 114). See also a similar 
thought on humanity as the hypostasis of the universe (Clément 1976, p. 91).  
27 As was carefully discussed by Gilles Deleuze, in art there is a fundamental irreplaceability of a 
masterpiece by something which belonged to the generality of the works of art. Every attempt to reproduce 
an incarnate artistic expression would require a repetition as an irreversible bringing into being of that 
which did not exist before. Since masterpieces do reflect artists’ souls and their distinct personhood, they 
cannot be substituted  and replaced because of the same reasons that persons cannot be substituted and 
replaced. (See more details in (Deleuze 2001, pp. 1-27)). 
28 S. Bulgakov expressed his attitude to the objectivising tendencies of the sciences of his time on the basis 
of a criticism of  its fragmented description of reality  and limited capacity of comprehending the world as 
living nature. The mathematical universe expels living subjects by converting it into the kingdom of 
shadows and “subjectless” objects:	  “Science	  deliberately	  commits	  a	  murder	  of	  the	  world	  and	  of	  nature,	  it	  studies	  nature’s	  corpse” (Bulgakov 2000, p. 183) (RO: «наука творит заведомое мироубийство и 
природоубийство, она изучает труп природы...» (Булгаков 1993, с. 199)). Bulgakov realises, just as 
Berdyaev did, the fundamental    paradox of science: on the one hand science transforms the world into a 
lifeless mechanism, on the other hand, science itself was produced through the subject’s contingent self-
definition  (Ibid., p. 188. RO: c. 205). The source of science, the foundation of its possibility, is to be found 
in humanity. Otherwise science becomes no more than an ingenious tool whose ultimate sense remains 
utterly obscure. Bulgakov anticipated this way of thought by formulating the thesis that  to understand 
science one should turn to the understanding of man. It is not science that explains man, but man who 
explains science. Philosophy of science is a branch of philosophical anthropology (Ibid., p. 173. RO: c. 
188).	  
29 See, for example (Berdyaev 1953, p. 41).  
30 RO: «Личность не есть часть, и не может быть частью в отношении к какому-либо целому, хотя 
бы к огромному целому, всему миру….Личность не составляется из частей, не есть агрегат, не есть 
слагаемое, она есть первичная целость» (Бердяев 1939, с. 20, 21). 
31 RO: «Тайна существования личности в ее абсолютной незаменимости, в ее однократности и 
единичности, в ее несравнимости» (Бердяев 1939, с. 22). 
32 RO: «Личность связана со свободой от детерминизма природы, она независима от механизма 
природы. Поэтому личность не есть феномен среди феноменов» (Бердяев 1939, c. 30). 
33 RO: «Личность не порождается родовым космическим процессом, не рождается от отца и матери, 
она происходит от Бога, является из другого мира» (Бердяев 1939, c. 32). 
34 The analogy comes from  St. Maximus the Confessor’s assertion that God knows things according to his 
will (Ambigua 7 [PG  91: 1085B]).  
35  RO:  «…и если в развитии положительных знаний о мире весь мир наконец сделается известным 
для человека, то этим познанием о мире фактическое противоречие в бытии самого человека все 
таки не будет устранено и поэтому определение смысла этого противоречия неизменно будет 
составлять для человека великую загадку бытия» (Несмелов 1905, с. 242). 
36 RO: «Человек должен восстать против рабства истории не для изоляции в самом себе, а для 
принятия всей истории в свою бесконечную субъективность, в которой мир есть часть человека» 
(Бердяев 1939, с. 221).  
37  RO:  «…всякая попытка человека осуществить в мире природное содержание своей личности 
путем развития физического содержания жизни необходимо заключает в себе неразрешимое 
внутреннее противоречие и естественно ни к чему не ведет человека» (Несмелов 1905, с. 243). 
38 RO: «при всех своих огромных успехах в культурном преобразовании действительности человек 
все таки остается…простою вещью мира, которая и возникает и разрушается лишь в силу 
необходимых законов физической природы и потому неведомо зачем существует под формою 
личности» (Несмелов 1905, с. 243). 
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39  RO: «..все частные противоречия мысли и жизни возникают из стремления человека осуществить 
идеальный образ безусловного бытия в необходимых границах внешних условий» (Несмелов 1905, 
с. 246). 
40 RO: «…Личностью может быть одно только безусловное бытие, - это каждый человек 
непосредственно сознает и достоверно знает в познании самого себя» (Несмелов 1905, с. 264).  
41   RO: «Но, существуя в качестве личности и в то же самое время   необходимо связанный 
механизмом внешних условий в качестве простой вещи физического мира, человек не есть 
безусловное бытие, а только предметно выражает в себе реальную связь условного и безусловного 
бытия, и потому, не зная о существовании другого мира, кроме наличного, он достоверно знает о 
существовании другого бытия, кроме условного, так как он в себе самом предметно выражает 
двоякое бытие – условное и  безусловное. Если бы загадочный факт этого выражения не отрицался 
в мнимонаучных объяснениях его, а действительно объяснялся, как и всякий непонятный факт факт 
бытия, то научная мысль вероятно давно бы пришла к библейскому учению о создании человека по 
образу Божию, потому что существование человека как реального образа Безусловной Сущности, 
строго научно может быть установлено и независимо от Библии, на основании одного только 
психологического анализа природы и содержания человеческой личности, и к Библии можно 
обратиться не   затем, чтобы почерпнуть из нее это учение, а только за тем, чтобы найти в ней 
объяснение  действительного факта. И объективное бытие Бога, и достоверное познание природы 
Его непосредственно даны человеку реальным бытием и природным содержанием его собственной 
личности, но почему и как именно возможна в условном бытии сама-то человеческая  личность, как 
реальный образ Бога, - этого мы не знаем и не можем знать, и Библия говорит нам о создании 
человека действием Божией воли» (Несмелов 1905, с. 264-65). 
42 RO: «И мы достоверно знаем в познании себя самих, что хотя наша собственная личность 
существует только в необходимых условиях физического мира, однако природою своею она все-
таки выражает не мир, а истинную природу самого Бесконечного и Безусловного, потому что 
бесконечное и безусловное есть не иное что, как свободное бытие для себя, а свободное бытие для 
себя и есть и может быть только бытием самосущной Личности» (Несмелов 1905, с. 269).    
43 RO: «Следовательно, содержанием нравственного сознания выражается не что иное, как 
природное самоопределение человеческой личности в условиях ее физического существования: 
нравственно для человека то, что должно быть осуществляемо человеком, а должно быть 
осуществляемо человеком то, что истинно человечно, а истинно человечно то, что выражает собой 
действительную природу человеческой личности независимо от условий, интересов и целей ее 
физического существования» (Несмелов 1905, с. 287). 
 
44 RO: «Но в том-то именно и заключается все дело, что истинная жизнь, о которой говорит 
человеку нравственное сознание, в действительности неосуществима, потому что человек 
существует не только в качестве свободного деятеля в мире, но и в качестве простой вещи мира, 
необходимо подчиненной всеобщим законам физического существования» (Несмелов 1905, с. 287-
88). 
 
45 Emphasis is added. RO: «конечным результатом науки о человеке в сущности является только 
неразрешимая загадка о нем: как он мог появиться в мире, когда природою своей личности он 
необходимо отрицает его [то есть мир, АН], сам в свою очередь отрицается миром?» (Несмелов 
1905, с. 372) (курсив мой АН). 
 
46 RO: «вся его рассчитанная добродетель в действительности покоится только на презрении к миру 
и на отрицании его, а вовсе не на желании раскрыть в нем и посредством него истину нравственного 
миропорядка и в этом раскрытии отобразить в мире жизнь Безусловной Личности» (Несмелов 1905, 
с. 391). 
 
47 This ontological difference can be illustrated as a contrast between humanity as consubstantial to the rest 
of creation on the one hand and as hypostatic formation on the other hand. Indeed,  being inseparable from 
reality in virtue of its embodiment, human persons can exist only in the context of their immediate non-
distance from reality (consubstantiality). On the other hand, being a hypostatic formation (humanity is 
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endowed with an ability to inhere the universe in its own subjectivity through the fusion of knowledge, to 
form the meaning and act in the universe as its self-consciousness and self-realization, or, theologically 
speaking, as its hypostasis), that is being fundamentally different from other material things, human persons 
are “infinitely” ontologically distant from those other things. The ability to distance themselves from  outer 
things (even, in abstraction, from one’s own body), makes human persons equally positioned with respect 
to all objects in the universe, so that they can be articulated by human subjectivity as different and 
uniformly distant from it. Paradoxically, on the one hand, because of  the infinite ontological distance from 
all things in the universe humanity is hypostatically commensurable  (and thus equally close) with respect 
to all objects in the universe,  including the universe as a whole, whereas on the other hand, being 
corporeally at non-distance from the universe, humanity is physically incommensurable with the universe.  
 
48 Gregory of Nyssa, “On the Making of Man,” in Selected Writings and Letters Gregory of Nyssa trans. W. 
Moore and H. A. Wilson, vol. 5 of NPNF, Series II, ed. Ph. Schaff and H. Wace (Grand Rapids, Mich.: 
Eerdmans,1994), pp. 396–97. 
 
49 St. Augustine, Confessiones 10.5.7 [ET:  (Chadwick 1991, pp. 182–83)]. 
50 See a comprehensive account on the unknowability of man in (Marion 2010, pp. 21-86).  
51 St. Augustine, De Trinitate, 10.5.7  [ET:  (McKenna 2002, p. 50)].  
 
52  RO: «человек и стремится не только к объяснению своего положения в мире, но и к познанию 
того пути, по которому он действительно мог бы выйти из этого положения…Достигнуть же 
познания вечной тайны бытия значит тоже самое, что фактически устранить эту тайну в бытии, то 
есть создать действительный путь к осуществлению человеком его назначения в мире и дать ему 
действительную возможность к фактическому осуществлению этого назначения. Об этом именно 
пути и об этой возможности и говорит человеку христианское вероучение. Оно сообщает то самое 
познание, без которого человек не может обойтись и которого, однако он не может создать» 
(Несмелов 1905, с. 409-410).   
 
53 “From fear of death man sows death, as a result of feeling a slave, he desires to dominate. Domination is 
always constrained to kill. The state is always subject to fear and therefor it is constrained to kill. It has no 
desire to wrestle against death” (Berdyaev 1943, p. 251) (RO: «Человек из страха смерти сеет смерть, из 
чувства рабства хочет господствовать. Господство всегда принуждено убивать. Государство всегда 
испытывает страх, и потому принуждено убивать. Оно не хочет бороться со смертью», (Бердяев 
1939, с. 209)). A manifesting discrepancy between the desire to find the sense of life on the one hand,  and 
the collective state-like life of man where human dignity is dismissed was described by E. Trubetskoi in 
following words: “On the one hand there is a powerful appeal of love to every man, on the other hand all 
peoples are armed from  top to toe for the mutual extermination. On the one hand there is an attempt of 
man to break the closed loop of the struggle for survival, to rise from the Earth in a joyous enthusiasm of 
love and, on the other hand, there is another illustration of the impotence of any of such an attempt, namely 
the state with its periodically repetitive and triumphant slogan all is for war (Trubetskoi 1922, p. 38) (RO: 
«С одной стороны – властный призыв любви ко всякому человеку, как таковому, а с другой стороны, 
- все народы вооружены с головы до ног для взаимного истребления. С одной стороны – попытка 
человека прорвать порочный круг всеобщей борьбы за существование, взлететь над землей в 
светлом подъеме любви, а с другой стороны, новая иллюстрация бессилия этой попытки, - 
государство с его периодически повторяющимися и периодически торжествующим лозунгом – все 
для войны» (Трубецкой 1922, с. 38)).             
54 RO: «Победа над смертью не может быть эволюцией, не может быть результатом необходимости: 
победа над смертью есть творчество, совместное творчество человека и Бога, есть результат 
свободы» (Бердяев 1939, с. 210). 
